3. Evaluation and lessons moving forward

With all that said and done, I am grateful to have undergone this investigation process as I now have a more pristine understanding on the complex relationships developed in relation to the waters of the Nile. This post therefore is a summary and (personal) points I believe requires further evaluation.

Firstly, resolving the root problems usually clears issues. What then is the root problem of this entire fiasco of sorts? It is known that Egypt depends heavily on the waters of the River Nile with its rapidly growing population (Swain, 2008). Could this therefore be solely responsible on Egypt’s ‘more rightful’ claim over the waters of the Nile seen from the earlier agreements in 1929 and 1959? I believe that it does make sense in the past where Egypt really depended on nothing but the Nile for waters for irrigation, fishing, electricity etc. However, in this day and age, advances in technology has made this claim seem like nothing but Egypt furthering its ‘hydro-hegemony’, using it as a form of leverage over the rest of the otherwise marginalised riparian states of the Nile (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Egypt, compared to some of the other riparian states, should feel blessed to have its geographical position. Despite it being a downstream (normally disadvantageous), it has direct access to both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, hence introducing other (already determined) sources of water for the ‘water-scarce’ nation. This includes desalination as well as better water storage facilities. Desalination has been successful in even more threatened ‘water-scarce’ nations like Israel and Singapore, so what is holding Egypt back? In addition, the Egypt is part of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, providing it with another huge source of water despite it being transboundary and hence also potential conflicts. Egypt could also potentially alter its “Century Storage Scheme”, instead of storing and hogging water along the Nile, could they shift to more localised forms of storage like reservoirs built off the Nile connected by pipes? These are just mere examples of potential solutions, but it shows that Egypt’s dependence on the Nile appears not to be solely based on water but maintaining a higher position in the power relations balance over the other North African nations.

In addition, Egypt has claimed that they may resort to military action should dams be built upstream which diverts and reduces their water quantities (Kimenya and Mbaku, 2015). This can also be seen as another form of assertion of its hydro-hegemony. With that said, I believe that with recent developments in the political conditions of the region, coupled with increasing involvement of big international agencies and nations such as China, this water-war is not due just yet. The Cooperative Framework Agreement acts as a form of non-aggression alliance against Egypt and Sudan, deterring any potential Egyptian military actions on upstream riparian nations because of water. In addition, the massive funding of China and World Bank on certain upstream development projects such as the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) acts as a further deterrence to potential Egyptian military actions. Further considerations include China’s position on the UN Security Council, Egypt’s position in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, as well as having their past haunt them (Suez Crisis, wars with Israel etc). As a result, I believe that it would be wise for Egypt to be content with their already dominant position in the Nile Basin and gain the moral high ground by consenting and committing to the Nile Basin commission’s future for a more equitable fair share.

This leads to my next point: why does the construction of a dam upstream necessarily spell doom to that of lower riparian states? Dams do divert water flow away, however, with the creation of a successful forum/commission in the form of the Nile Basin Initiative, could they not have an agreement on the control of the diversion of the Nile’s waters? I do strongly believe that should Egypt suffer from a shortage, a call to Ethiopia to open the floodgates of the GERD would and should settle the issue. Moreover, it does not seem that the source of the Nile is drying up or depleting anytime soon. In short, I believe that the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) should be complimented, for it provides not only a more equitable sharing of the utilisation of the Nile’s waters but also a platform for greater cooperation even with the presence of dams and previously frowned-upon activities upstream.

Although I think that credit should be given when due, it is at the same time important to not be complacent on current successes. The CFA (if signed by all the riparian states) would prove to be the world’s first cooperation over a transboundary water source, however I believe that this merely marks the beginning of an otherwise longer more arduous journey. It is also crucial that the riparian states do not treat the CFA as a tool for shared responsibility. This is a precarious position to take as it may promote instead of alleviating mistakes of the past and future. Moreover, it is crucial to point out that the conditions under which a forum like the CFA is created has its biases and issues. For example, each representing nation is subject to its own political agenda, and only by looking at the bigger picture of the region as a whole would they achieve fairness and truly equitable allocations of the Nile’s waters.

This leads to my final evaluation point, we’ve have long been scrutinising Egypt’s dominance over the Nile riparian states, as well as the leftover effects from colonialism and the successes and failures of cooperative forums (NBI, CFA). However, it is paramount to note that these are considered extreme top-down approaches towards management of the Nile’s waters. Therefore, I believe that it would be careless to not take into account participatory and bottom-up approaches towards this issue. We should also look at the micro-geographies involved, as internal conflicts within nations have significant impacts on the politics and power relations within a nation. Examples include the Oromia crisis in Ethiopia as well as internalviolence in Sudan, due to the multitudes of differing ethnicities and religions, should be focused on (Amare, 2014). Hence, I am convinced that cooperation has to be promoted not only on an international level, but on regional as well as provincial levels regardless of nation-boundaries as well.

Much research has been done into this matter. Yet, I believe that this complex situation requires more action than words. Regardless, should you be interested to read further about issues regarding water and politics, I would strongly recommend Prof. David Shinn’s blog, where I drew certain notions and inspiration from.

References:

Amare, S. (2014). Ethiopia: a nation at crossroads. Aigaforum, [online] Available at: <http://aigaforum.com/articles/A-nation-at-a-crossroads.pdf>

Kimenyi, M., & Mbaku, J. (2015). Governing the Nile river basin: The search for a new legal regime. Brookings Institution Press.

Swain, A. (2008). Mission not yet accomplished: managing water resources in the Nile River basin. Journal of International Affairs, 201-214.

Zeitoun, M. and Warner, J. (2006). ‘Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts’, Water Policy, 8(5), p. 435.

2. Nile Basin Initiative

In this post, we focus more on the efforts and developments in the cooperation between riparian states of the Nile Basin. There is a plethora of regional frameworks introduced in the latter part of the 20^th Century, but our focus would primarily be on the Nile Basin Commission’s efforts, the Nile Basin Initiative and the Cooperative Framework Agreement.

The parties involved saw the importance in acquiring more accurate and comprehensive data of the Nile, of which can be used to discern a more equitable allocation of water. This saw the creation of the ‘Permanent Joint Technical Commission’ from the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. This Technical Commission focused on more accurate collection and analysis of hydrometeorological data of the basin that aids in the riparian states in future planning of development and irrigation projects, as well as preliminary work for future cooperation and frameworks (Howell and Allan, 1994). This evolved into the Nile Basin Commission in 1983, unofficially coined ‘UNDUGU’, where Ndugu meant ‘brotherhood’ in Swahili (Mekonnen, 2010). Their first plan of action was to promote stronger cooperation amongst African nations in the Nile Basin. Two missions were executed, the first being a preliminary/exploratory mission, similar to that of the aforementioned focus on a comprehensive study of the Nile Basin, including that of economic and technical development plans. The second was aimed as a fact-finding mission, creating a strong framework for future regional cooperation among the Nile riparian states, drawing lessons from projects in the past. In addition, the second mission introduced the evaluation of populations and nations’ dependencies on the Nile waters as a life source (irrigation, fishing etc.), providing a more direct relationship and study of the utilisation of the Nile water on certain nations’. With overwhelming Egyptian influence, UNDUGU soon became irrelevant and was duly replaced by the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) in 1992. It was a significant milestone in the evolution of African (Nile basin in particular) cooperative joint frameworks, with it being a crucial ‘launch pad’ for the Nile River Action Plan – an instrumental step in the founding of the Nile Basin Initiative and the Cooperative Framework Agreement that follows (Kimenya and Mbaku, 2015).

This brings us to our main focal point of this post, the Nile Basin Initiative. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was considered the “first basin-wide agreement regarding the Nile River”, with every riparian state participating (Eritrea maintained an observer) (Suvarna, 2006). Based on the NBI, it aims to be a ‘regional intergovernmental partnership that seeks to develop the River Nile in a cooperative manner, sharing substantial socio-economic benefits and promote regional peace and security’. The efforts of the NBI can be seen in 3 distinct main programs, the Shared Vision Program, the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Program, of which all aim to use relevant and accurate data and monitoring, as well as efficient training and cooperation within riparian states to create platforms for dialogues and resolution of issues, ensuring that the basin is managed not only sustainably but also equitably (Nile Basin Initiative). This is seen as a major changing point in the geopolitical order of the Nile Basin, as the signing of the NBI shows a change in the pre-existing power relations within the region, from one which relies on military might, history and leveraging power, to a more participatory and democratic governance (Piechart, 2003). This is crucially important as it results in a more sustainable and equitable sharing of the Nile’s waters, but at the same time, it remained the source of disagreement, which would be further investigated under the Cooperative Framework Agreement. In addition, the NBI was not created as the ‘permanent fix’ of the dissolution of issues relating to the River Nile. It was created as a formal groundwork, to set aside the differences (power relations and nationalistic attitudes in allocation of the Nile’s waters) that pre-exist and to align the objectives of the members before producing a more permanent viable framework, the Cooperative Framework Agreement (Suvarna, 2006).

The Cooperative Framework Agreement, currently signed and ratified by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania, was introduced as the ‘permanent antidote’ creating a more sustainable and equitable management of the Nile’s waters. The signatories were “tired of getting permission from Egypt before using Nile waters for any development projects” such as dam constructions and irrigation. By inference, as well as by studying the negotiation process of the Cooperative Framework Agreement, it is undoubted that Egypt and Sudan both are strongly opposed to it. Why would these riparian states be so apprehensive towards this panacea of all we may ask? The Cooperative Framework Agreement understood that the previous bilateral treaties and agreements (mentioned in the blogs relating to colonialism and imperialism) were the biggest challenges to a successful permanent framework, and hence sought to be a ‘more regional and inclusive agreement able to replace these old agreements’ (Kimenya and Mbaku, 2015). However, it also required Egypt and Sudan, both major beneficiaries to give up their historically acquired rights to a more-than-fair share of the River Nile (Mekonnen, 2010). Egypt and Sudan both also claim that, according to the theory of Universal Succession, previously agreed treaties and agreements should still be followed. However, this fact was already abrogated by the 1978 Vienna Convention about State Succession and Treaties, specifically in article 14 where ‘Nothing in the present Convention shall be considered as prejudging in any respect any question relating to the validity of a treaty.’

In addition, in a bid to boost its own political standing within the agreement, Egypt aims to introduce ‘water security’ into the framework as a condition for their signature, attempting to protect its national security, as Egypt has significant dependence on the River Nile. It was even made known that Egypt does not fear using military action as a tool in ensuring its share of the Nile waters (Kendie, 1999). Till this day, negotiations are still ongoing and some have even feared that this maybe the toppling point where nations go to war over water.

References:

Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Kendie, D. (1999). Egypt and the hydro-politics of the Blue Nile River. Northeast African Studies, 6(1), 141-169.

Kimenyi, M., & Mbaku, J. (2015). Governing the Nile river basin: The search for a new legal regime. Brookings Institution Press.

Mekonnen, D. Z. (2010). The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement negotiations and the adoption of a ‘Water Security’paradigm: Flight into obscurity or a logical cul-de-sac?. European Journal of International Law, 21(2), 421-440.

Peichert, H. (2003). The Nile basin initiative: a catalyst for cooperation. In Security and Environment in the Mediterranean (pp. 761-774). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Suvarna, S. (2006). Development Aid in an Environmental Context: Using Microfinance to Promote Equitable and Sustainable Water Use in the Nile Basin. BC Envtl. Aff. L. Rev., 33, 449.

1. Principles and Evolution of International Law regarding Transboundary Water Sources

With increasing numbers of previous colonies gaining independence coupled with the increase in global population numbers, we see a heightened interest in governance and international laws over transboundary water sources, a major source of sustenance for humans. In this post, I would like to briefly illustrate the few major developments in international law regarding transboundary water sources, notwithstanding if it is linked to the River Nile.

The emergence over a need for international law over water bodies came about in the 1815 Vienna Conference, which was solely focused on the role of navigation over the Danube River. However, with increasing population growth and dependency on water sources for irrigation as well as the use of dams, there is a scream for a wider scope of international law protecting transboundary water sources. The Harmon Doctrine was also introduced, defining sovereignty of water resources particularly along the Rio Grande in a bid to resolve conflict between USA and Mexico. The term ‘absolute sovereignty’ was also then first introduced to the global context. Despite these attempts at creating a form of international law over transboundary water sources, they were not cemented nor followed at that time hence they only appeal as attempts and nothing more (McCaffrey, 1996).

However, the aforementioned attempts prove as vital first steps towards the generation and evolution of a more comprehensive and received international law over water. The 1966 Helsinki Rules on waters of international rivers was a vital changing point. It is agreed to be applicable to most drainage basins that cross over national borders, with the exempt of those with had previous agreements already present. Most importantly, it asserts a form of ‘equitable sharing’, noted “equity does not mean distribution by equal share, but by fair shares…” The Helsinki Rules also introduced the term of ‘International Drainage Basins’, which drew the boundaries of rivers to that of watersheds. This proved key in the definition of specific water sources but also as a point of conflict. In specific terms to the Nile, the Nile basin was previously seen to stretch to the Suez Canal, however, with that definition put in place, the Suez Canal is not the boundary as it is artificial. Hence, the Nile basin would seemingly stretch eastwards to the Sinai mountain range, bringing in new parties and issues of contention to the already contentious Nile (McCaffrey, 1999). Also, with it being the first global international law over water, there was no form of mechanisms in placethat strictly enforced that nations followed that rule (Browne, 2003). In addition, it can be depicted as an extreme top-down approach by the then “first-world” countries in trying to assert a form of rule on the world, regardless of signatories. In relation to the Nile, it must also be noted that no riparian states along the Nile actually sign nor agree explicitly to the Helsinki Rules, despite many of them claiming that previous agreements such as the 1929 and 1959 agreement nullified for misrepresentation by previous Colonial power, UK. Despite everything, it is still classified as a pioneering step towards establishing an international law over water (Raj and Salman, 1999).

From the 1966 Helsinki Rules, it became prevalent that it is difficult to establish a general set of laws applicable to ALL international rivers in particular due to each river having different characteristics. In addition, the Helsinki Rules shows a form of rejection of pre-existing theories of absolute sovereignty (Harmon Doctrine).

In the latter part of the 20^th century, there were more evolutions in relation to international laws surrounding transboundary waters. In this part, I would like to briefly introduce a few evolutions of the 1966 Helsinki Rules as well as specific laws focused on the Nile.

In 1997, there was the Convention on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Its focus was to consider sustainable utilisation of watercourses for future generations. It is comparable to that of the Helsinki Rules; however, the same issues arose, with it only being ratified by only 36 states (of which none from the Nile basin). In addition, the language used was contentious, questioning the actual definition of “obligation to do no harm” in article 7 of the document, as there are times where upper riparian states have legitimate claims and utilisation over watercourses which may inevitably negatively affect lower riparian states (McCaffrey 1998).

In more recent times, the Berlin Rules on Water Resources in 2004 was created which supercedes the 1966 Helsinki Rules. This further promotes more equitable sharing of water resources. Also, it saw the merging of different international laws such that they cover the loopholes of one another, such as the 1997 Convention used to supplement the Berlin Rules (McCaffrey, 1999). This saw an attempt to ultimately create an international law that applies to the world, but at the same time ensuring that there are no loopholes for nations to exploit. Also, the Berlin Rules on Water Resources saw the focus of weighing the needs of the people depending on the water resource. The water resources are equitably shared with relation to the dependency ratio which brought about a more fair allocation of water as well as more just claims to rights over certain quantities of water (Dellapema, 2008).

More specific to the Nile, the 1968 Ecological Convention for preservation of NaturalResources from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit Conference at Algiers aimed to promote cooperation and communication between nations to study and resolve problems arising with respect to the Nile. This proved as a good enough first step of the riparian states of the Nile to acknowledge that more work and cooperation has to be put into allocating the waters of the Nile. This could also see as the prelude to that of the Nile Basin Initiative, which we would discuss in detail in the next post. 

References:

Dellapenna, J. (2008). International water law in a climate of disruption. Mich. St. U. Coll. LJ Int'l L., 17, 43.

McCaffrey, S. (1998). The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: prospects and pitfalls. World Bank Technical Paper, 17-28.

McCaffrey, S. (1999). International groundwater law: evolution and context. World Bank Technical Paper, 139-162.

McCaffrey, S. C. (1996). Harmon doctrine one hundred years later: Buried, not praised, the. Nat. Resources J., 36, 965.

McCaffrey, S. C., & Sinjela, M. (1998). The 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses. The American Journal of International Law, 92(1), 97-107.

Raj, K., & Salman, S. M. A. (1999). International groundwater law and the World Bank policy for projects on transboundary groundwater. In Groundwater: Legal and Policy Perspectives: Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.