1. Principles and Evolution of International Law regarding Transboundary Water Sources

With increasing numbers of previous colonies gaining independence coupled with the increase in global population numbers, we see a heightened interest in governance and international laws over transboundary water sources, a major source of sustenance for humans. In this post, I would like to briefly illustrate the few major developments in international law regarding transboundary water sources, notwithstanding if it is linked to the River Nile.

The emergence over a need for international law over water bodies came about in the 1815 Vienna Conference, which was solely focused on the role of navigation over the Danube River. However, with increasing population growth and dependency on water sources for irrigation as well as the use of dams, there is a scream for a wider scope of international law protecting transboundary water sources. The Harmon Doctrine was also introduced, defining sovereignty of water resources particularly along the Rio Grande in a bid to resolve conflict between USA and Mexico. The term ‘absolute sovereignty’ was also then first introduced to the global context. Despite these attempts at creating a form of international law over transboundary water sources, they were not cemented nor followed at that time hence they only appeal as attempts and nothing more (McCaffrey, 1996).

However, the aforementioned attempts prove as vital first steps towards the generation and evolution of a more comprehensive and received international law over water. The 1966 Helsinki Rules on waters of international rivers was a vital changing point. It is agreed to be applicable to most drainage basins that cross over national borders, with the exempt of those with had previous agreements already present. Most importantly, it asserts a form of ‘equitable sharing’, noted “equity does not mean distribution by equal share, but by fair shares…” The Helsinki Rules also introduced the term of ‘International Drainage Basins’, which drew the boundaries of rivers to that of watersheds. This proved key in the definition of specific water sources but also as a point of conflict. In specific terms to the Nile, the Nile basin was previously seen to stretch to the Suez Canal, however, with that definition put in place, the Suez Canal is not the boundary as it is artificial. Hence, the Nile basin would seemingly stretch eastwards to the Sinai mountain range, bringing in new parties and issues of contention to the already contentious Nile (McCaffrey, 1999). Also, with it being the first global international law over water, there was no form of mechanisms in placethat strictly enforced that nations followed that rule (Browne, 2003). In addition, it can be depicted as an extreme top-down approach by the then “first-world” countries in trying to assert a form of rule on the world, regardless of signatories. In relation to the Nile, it must also be noted that no riparian states along the Nile actually sign nor agree explicitly to the Helsinki Rules, despite many of them claiming that previous agreements such as the 1929 and 1959 agreement nullified for misrepresentation by previous Colonial power, UK. Despite everything, it is still classified as a pioneering step towards establishing an international law over water (Raj and Salman, 1999).

From the 1966 Helsinki Rules, it became prevalent that it is difficult to establish a general set of laws applicable to ALL international rivers in particular due to each river having different characteristics. In addition, the Helsinki Rules shows a form of rejection of pre-existing theories of absolute sovereignty (Harmon Doctrine).

In the latter part of the 20^th century, there were more evolutions in relation to international laws surrounding transboundary waters. In this part, I would like to briefly introduce a few evolutions of the 1966 Helsinki Rules as well as specific laws focused on the Nile.

In 1997, there was the Convention on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Its focus was to consider sustainable utilisation of watercourses for future generations. It is comparable to that of the Helsinki Rules; however, the same issues arose, with it only being ratified by only 36 states (of which none from the Nile basin). In addition, the language used was contentious, questioning the actual definition of “obligation to do no harm” in article 7 of the document, as there are times where upper riparian states have legitimate claims and utilisation over watercourses which may inevitably negatively affect lower riparian states (McCaffrey 1998).

In more recent times, the Berlin Rules on Water Resources in 2004 was created which supercedes the 1966 Helsinki Rules. This further promotes more equitable sharing of water resources. Also, it saw the merging of different international laws such that they cover the loopholes of one another, such as the 1997 Convention used to supplement the Berlin Rules (McCaffrey, 1999). This saw an attempt to ultimately create an international law that applies to the world, but at the same time ensuring that there are no loopholes for nations to exploit. Also, the Berlin Rules on Water Resources saw the focus of weighing the needs of the people depending on the water resource. The water resources are equitably shared with relation to the dependency ratio which brought about a more fair allocation of water as well as more just claims to rights over certain quantities of water (Dellapema, 2008).

More specific to the Nile, the 1968 Ecological Convention for preservation of NaturalResources from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit Conference at Algiers aimed to promote cooperation and communication between nations to study and resolve problems arising with respect to the Nile. This proved as a good enough first step of the riparian states of the Nile to acknowledge that more work and cooperation has to be put into allocating the waters of the Nile. This could also see as the prelude to that of the Nile Basin Initiative, which we would discuss in detail in the next post. 

References:

Dellapenna, J. (2008). International water law in a climate of disruption. Mich. St. U. Coll. LJ Int'l L., 17, 43.

McCaffrey, S. (1998). The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: prospects and pitfalls. World Bank Technical Paper, 17-28.

McCaffrey, S. (1999). International groundwater law: evolution and context. World Bank Technical Paper, 139-162.

McCaffrey, S. C. (1996). Harmon doctrine one hundred years later: Buried, not praised, the. Nat. Resources J., 36, 965.

McCaffrey, S. C., & Sinjela, M. (1998). The 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses. The American Journal of International Law, 92(1), 97-107.

Raj, K., & Salman, S. M. A. (1999). International groundwater law and the World Bank policy for projects on transboundary groundwater. In Groundwater: Legal and Policy Perspectives: Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.

Part 3: The Cold War: Suez Crisis and its effects on the Nile

The Suez Crisis of 1956, or the Tripartite Aggression was a changing point in the political sphere of influence in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt which as seen from my previous blogposts have been an integral player in the determination of the integrity of the River Nile. This blogpost therefore focuses on the importance of the Suez Crisis and how it has a knock-on effect on the geopolitical order surrounding the River Nile - in part due to the changing stance of the Western Powers (namely U.S and U.K) on decolonisation and self-determination. The Suez Crisis can be seen as the 'straw that broke the camel's back', the event which led to the hastening of decolonisation in Africa and the Middle East.

Our evaluation should begin with a brief comparison between the different leaders of Egypt at that time and how it had a significant impact on the events preceding the change in power as well as Egypt's stance on the Cold War world order. This had quite substantial repercussions on the politics along the River Nile. The last king of Egypt, King Farouk was overthrown by the Nationalist duo of then General Mohammed Naguib and Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Nasser, who subsequently became the first and second President's of Egypt. King Farouk was arguably merely a puppet for the Western Powers, namely the United Kingdom who at that time shared control of the Suez Canal with France. The Free Officers Movement, led by Naguib and Nasser was against the idea of Egypt being a mere pawn of the West, in addition, they had garnered the support of the masses, particularly due to incidents such as the 'Cairo Fires' and Black Saturday (King, 1989). With the exile of the last king of Egypt led to the creation of the Revolution Command Council (RCC), consisting mostly of members from the Free Officers. General Naguib was then sworn in as the first President of Egypt. His reign however did not last long as he had differing opinions to that of his younger compatriots (Nasser), wanting the country to be placed under civilian rule and the military to act as more of a shield rather than the ruler (Reich, 1990). Gamal Nasser then finally took chairmanship of the RCC, and became the second president of Egypt. His anti-imperialist stance and adoption of 'positive neutralism' in the period of the Cold War drew great attention to Egypt, as he could be seen as often trying to play off the Allies against the Soviets leveraging on the Suez Canal (which was nationalised) in a bid to lift Egypt's position in the Global World order (Aburish, 2004; Mansfield, 1973). In addition, the funding of the Aswan (High) Dam then was a additional card Nasser played, understanding that the Allies and Soviet Union were both keen on maintaining friendly relations with Egypt as the then leader of the Arab world. In the end, the Allies bowed out leaving the Aswan dam to be funded by the Soviet (Gaddis, 1998). These basic understanding of the shift in power of Egypt's rulers should provide a satisfactory insight to Egyptian politics then and how it could affect not only Egypt's reign of the Nile waters but also how the fellow players who were colonies or protectorates such as Sudan and Uganda changed their stance and gained courage to actively seek for self-determination against the colonial powers.

In addition, Nasser's rule was met with its first challenge and one of the key changing events shifting the power relations present in Northern Africa and Middle East in the late 1956 in the form of an Israeli, U.K and French invasion - the Suez Crisis. Prior to the actual invasion, the canal was seized by President Nasser and his troops in a bid to nationalise the nation's crown jewel. At that time, the canal was controlled by the British and the French, and hence a main objective of their participation in the invasion was to restore the canal to its 'rightful' owners (Kyle, 1991). In addition, the canal was a key installation which facilitates the movement of important raw materials - namely oil, from the Middle East and Saudi Arabia to the West. Not going into too much detail with regards to the invasion, it can be simply cited as one of the key failures in U.K's history, which to some extent leading some to cite it as the key changing point in U.K's global power. The failure was particularly important for it saw the U.S.A not only refuse to support the U.K and France, but also threatened to economically destabilise the British economy. The eventual withdrawal of the Allied forces in Egypt culminated Egypt's rise as a leader of the Arab world and signified their strength in the region (Owen, 2002). The victory (despite political) over Western Powers from a previous colony that gained independence merely years ago aspired many other colonies in Africa and the Middle East to actively seek self-determination. In addition, with the British failure and strenuous ties between Britain and the U.S.A, Britain had to adopt a more benign foreign policy post-Suez crisis, giving in to the UN's (USA) demands for collective decolonisation (Jervis, 1997).

With all that established, we hence consider how the aforementioned events affects the sovereignty and the power relations of the river Nile. As seen, the Soviet funding of the Aswan (High) dam, coupled with the Egyptian victory over the Western powers solidified their higher position in the ladder despite being a downstream riparian. In addition, many of the nations along the Nile were at that time more concerned about other issues such as independence. As a result, it is obvious that Egypt was not only victorious in Suez, but also gained victory over the dominance of the course of the Nile. However, with the riparians slowly gaining independence, e.g. Sudan, the previous treaties with respect to rights of the water were challenged and repudiated as a form of misrepresentation as much of the treaties (mentioned in my previous posts) clearly show that the treaties were signed by colonial rulers and not representatives of the nation itself. In conclusion, the introduction of Nasserism and the rise of Egypt as a key player in the region has significant impacts, not in the Middle East and the Arab world but in Africa and the rest of the world as many colonies then saw how a previous colony managed to rise against all odds and gained not only victory against their previous colonial rulers but also recognition in the global geopolitical order.

This leads us to our next blogpost where we discuss and investigate how these independent nations with personal political agendas solve the 'conflict' of water of the Nile.

References:

Aburish, S. K. (2004). Nasser: The Last Arab. Macmillan.

Gaddis, J. L. (1998). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES, 32(1), 196-197.

Jervis, R. (1997). Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy. ANNALS-AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1(553), 209-209.

Kyle, K. (1991). Suez: Britain's end of Empire in the Middle East. IB Tauris.

Mansfield, P. (1973). The Middle East: a political and economic survey. Oxford University Press.

Owen, R. (2002). State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. Routledge.

Reich, B. (1990). Political leaders of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa: a biographical dictionary. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Wucher, J. K. (1989). Historical dictionary of Egypt. American Univ. in Cairo Press.

Part 2: Post World Wars, Self-Determination and the effects on the Geopolitical Order of the River Nile.

Continuing from the previous blogposts, we move forward in time to a different era, one where decolonisation was rife and states in Africa in particular were vying for their right towards self-determination. This results in a shift in the power struggles with respect to vying for the rights over the River Nile as well as puts plenty of the previous negotiations and treaties set by previous Colonial Rulers in shade due to aspects of "misrepresentation" (Mekonnen, 2010). I will take into considerations the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, followed by the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. We must also keep in mind the importance of the time frame and the changing dynamics of the global order due to certain events such as World War I, World War II, the Cold War etc.

With the end of the first world war, it resulted in the breakdown of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The conflicts between the 'Imperialists' also resulted in a level of distaste and questioning of the Colonial Powers' right to rule over other countries. Furthermore, the huge military losses in Europe led to a shift in the military presence in African colonies, can we therefore assume a stronger resolve on the part of the previously-oppressed such as Ethiopia in vying for rights over the use of the Blue Nile? In addition, events such as the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the stance of Woodrow Wilson (then American President) encouraged a new altered form of international framework. Taking into account the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, we try to find parallels that can be drawn towards the attitudes towards self-determination from that of water use and rights, and vice-versa.

It is also of great importance that we understand the primary uses of the Nile Water in Egypt and Sudan at that time (Swain, 1997). With increasing population numbers, coupled with the encouragement and promotion in cotton cultivation in Egypt, with considerations to the seasonalities involved in the cultivation of cotton, there was a need to shift from seasonal flooding methods to one of artificial irrigation. This led to a series of debates and negotiations over the claims to the rights of water use from upper and lower riparian countries. The 1929 Nile Water Agreement is important to note for it undermined weaker nations' actual claim of its own natural resource within its territories, causing an imbalance within the political sphere of the River Nile. Theoretically speaking, upper riparian states should and do hold sovereignty and control of not only their own rights to use the water within part of the river but are also hence in control of the downstream water quality/quantity etc. The 1929 Nile Water Agreement shows otherwise, as it was predominantly a negotiation deal between Egypt and the British Empire, over the use of the Nile Waters in Egypt and Sudan. Not only does it not take into account that of the interests of upper riparian states like Ethiopia along the Blue Nile and the Central East African nations along the White Nile, the agreement favoured Egypt tremendously (Howell and Allan, 1994). Despite allowing Sudan the right to construct along the River Nile for the benefit and development of the country, it had to go through the screening by that of the Egyptian Nile water commission of that time. Hence, this agreement highlights the then dominance of Egypt due to its military and strong links to the British Empire in control over the Nile, regardless that it supposedly should have the least power in terms of rights to the Nile based on geography. Could we hence also perceive a potential growing resistance of sorts against the rule and power of Colonial Powers and their "more important Nile Colonies". 

Post-World War II, there was yet another reshuffle in the geopolitical order and redefinition of the international framework particularly with relation to Colonies. The Atlantic Charter in 1941 somewhat set the stage for Colonies' right to self-determination. We hence consider the changes towards agreements and treaties set prior to nation's self-determination, and debunk the previous claims to water use of the Nile based on the misrepresentation of the nation's previous Colonial rulers or influences. However, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement may prove otherwise. This agreement was held between that of the previously mentioned two lower riparian states of Egypt and Sudan in the 1929 agreement, not taking into consideration the quantity/quality or right of use of water in the upper riparian states. In addition, it could be somewhat seen as a leftover effect of previous colonial era decisions, retaining Egypt's dominance over the control and delegation of the Nile Waters (Abdalla, 1971). Furthermore, it could be argued that the 1959 agreement was one of the key stepping stones for Egypt, above all the previous treaties and decisions made by that of the British Empire in their interests, for the construction of the Aswan High dam, which evolved to be a major point of contestation with respect to the right and use of the Nile Waters. 

Hence, despite self-determination being encouraged and nations along the Nile starting to gain independence, we are able to perceive a form of retention of previous Imperialist interests' in the claims of the River Nile, with Egypt remaining as the major powerhouse in terms of negotiations and agreements over the waters. With this conclusion, we will therefore investigate Egypt's power to this matter, whether it was due to a better developed framework and commission in understanding the needs of the people over the Water, or was it due to sheer military and previous colonial bias that elevated them to a higher geopolitical standing in the region in question.


References:
Abdalla, I. H. (1971). The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in Sudanese‐Egyptian relations. Middle Eastern Studies, 7(3), 329-341.

Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Mekonnen, D. Z. (2010). The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement negotiations and the adoption of a ‘Water Security’paradigm: Flight into obscurity or a logical cul-de-sac?. European Journal of International Law, 21(2), 421-440.

Swain, A. (1997). Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35(04), 675-694.

Part 1: Beginning of the undoing of Colonialism and the knock over effect of Colonial Africa on the River Nile

Having reevaluate my previous blogpost, I realised the harsh overstatement of asserting that Imperialism and Colonisation of the 19th Century was of large extent due to the importance of domination over the Suez canal. In the following few posts, I seek to highlight the localised individual treaties between countries (or "representatives") of that era and its repercussions to current and future negotiations over the right and claims of the River Nile.

There has been plenty of treaties and agreements set between different agents with regards to the use and rights of the River Nile, however I will only mention a few that I believe have significant effects (be it direct or simply worth noting).

Map of Africa in 1902

Firstly, my analysis would begin with the dissecting of the River Nile into 3 different regions, the lower Riparian states (Egypt and Sudan), the Blue Nile (Ethiopia or then 'Abyssinia') and the White Nile. My analysis would also follow a certain timeline, dating back to the late and early 19th and 20th Century where colonialism was rife, to that of the middle of the 20th Century when African states were rapidly gaining independence, finally to current and possibly the future. It would be beneficial if you were to compare the maps of 1902 to that of today (in my 2nd blogpost).

We set off investigating the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia over drawing the borders between Sudan (then Britain colony) and Ethiopia, of which Article 3 relates to the use of the waters in the Blue Nile.

Article III reads: "His Majestythe Emperor Menelek II, King of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan". 

Till today, this treaty remains one of the most controversial, considering that it was agreed upon by Great Britain for Sudan with Ethiopia. To briefly understand the context of the issue, Ethiopia is the  Upper Riparian state in the equation, and they are, by this agreement, somewhat constrained by the Lower Riparian states, Sudan and Egypt (of which both are controlled by Great Britain).

I begin by investigating the dynamics of the Geopolitical order of that region at that time and its implications on the claims over the Blue Nile. Sudan and Egypt, both represented by Great Britain, the then strongest and largest Empire in the world had nullified the influence of Ethiopia over their own rights over their own resources. This is somewhat interesting as the lower riparian states have put a foothold over the river, despite the fact that lower riparian states are often at the hands of those upstream. In addition, how did Great Britain at that time exert influence over an independent state over the control of their own natural resource which the incumbent has absolute right over considering the resource lies within its own territory. These have varying effects over certain debates and negotiations between the respective agents involved till present times. Ethiopia questioned the validity of the agreement considering that it has "never been ratified", hence there is no binding terms and conditions nor legal right over the agreement in that day. Post-independence, Sudan and Ethiopia debated on the validity of the agreement as the agreement was signed by Great Britain for Sudan, hence Sudan claims that the agreement does not hold post-independence. Finally, the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936 was recognised by the UK, hence nullifying all previous agreements and negotiations.

The language used in the agreement was also a point of contention, as both parties understood the agreement in favour of themselves. The intricate details of the agreement was not ironed out, and led to differing attitudes towards the Blue Nile. For example, "not arrest" was questioned by Ethiopia, and they perceived it to not being a synonym to "not use". This proved to be an additional focal point of the debate which led to the breakdown of negotiations and the ultimate nullifying of the agreement. However, the fact that the agreement was not ratified showed that both were somewhat appeased with what they thought the agreement meant. Therefore this proved to be conflicting as both claims over the Blue Nile were at that time legitimate held by the agreement, and the only superior intra-governing body then who could possibly intervene (the League of Nations) was strongly influenced by the British empire.

Finally, I would like to draw focus on a more local bottom-up approach towards this claim, and am opening this up for debate. With Ethiopia then being contained by this agreement, as well as others (shall not go into too much detail), the effects on local agriculture producers was stark, as depicted by poor food production of Ethiopia even till today. Understanding that the Ethiopian government was somewhat deterred by external forces, the people were subject to the effects of this "failed-governance" and should naturally show a degree of unhappiness towards their rulers. How then did the locals source for alternative sources of water? Was it enough to feed them and keep them happy? And did that lead to a form of "self-governing" in a more micro-geographical scale?

This agreement however holds significant importance in our understanding of treaties and agreements and the crucial role of external bodies observing and validating the agreement. Also, the recognition that there are flaws within the article yet not dealing with it could prove to be a point of study and further investigation. We will use this article as reference over the next 2 blogposts, regardless of its validity, in understanding how Colonial Era decisions and treaties have an impact on today's geopolitical order over the River Nile (Blue Nile in particular).

Reference:
Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.



P/s: to my fellow readers, this is not the end of a 3 part series where I breakdown individual important treaties and its current and possibly future implications. Stay tuned.

Imperialism, Post-Colonialism and its effects on the Politics along the River Nile

This episode investigates the relationship between historical contexts and the earlier establishments of the countries along the River Nile, to that of the current geopolitical discourse around water rights, whether it be influenced solely by the equitable and sustainable use of water from the Nile or is there any exogenous factors contributing to the discourse.

Image taken from Google Images

Walter Crane's Imperial Federation Map showing the extent of the British Empire in 1886 allows us to view the attitudes of the British then. Despite not showing the direct occupation of Egypt and Sudan on the map (Egypt was occupied by the British in 1882, Sudan afterwards), we are able to use various methods to showcase the then forms of Orientalism. Interpretations of the map based on geometry, representational hierarchies and decoration exemplifies the British domination of the world at that time. We can see the British-centric attitudes with Britannia being in the middle of the map (via Mercator Projection), sitting on top of the World with her trident pointing towards the middle of the world. In addition, the various trade routes drawn from Britain shows a "discursive grid of Western Knowledge and Power" across the world. Most importantly, the decoration of African labour shows the domination and rule of Britain over her colonies. The map also further shows the gender-biased nature of Colonialism, with the colonised females being sexualised, showing weakness and passivity of the colonies. This aligns with Edward Said's Orientalism, fictionally showing that the Orient as an "irrational, psychologically weak and feminised, non-European Other".

Following the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Africa was further dissected and claimed by different European powers in the "Scramble for Africa". The British Empire took control of the countries along the River Nile, except for the Ethiopian Empire who managed to fend off European invasion and influence. Linking this to the current geopolitical context in the region of the River Nile, we consider various exogenous factors contributing to the political discourse of the area.

We first consider the British intent in the 19th century whilst colonising Sudan and leaving Egypt as a protectorate. British interests then was not on the River Nile, but more so on the Suez Canal and protecting its dominant trade routes across the world. Despite at first rejecting wholly to the construction of the Suez Canal as it would threaten British controlled trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Colony). Regardless, the Suez Canal was constructed by the French and due to financial problems, it ended up with the sale of the Egyptian's share of the canal to the British to give the British leverage in decision making in the region. Hence, this very intent of colonising Egypt undermines the British and Egyptian reign on the River Nile, seeing it not as important a priority as compared to the Suez Canal. 

To add on, there is definitely a degree of coincidence to the British expansion across the River Nile. As the British Empire was keen on connecting the strategically important Suez Canal to the mineral rich South, the British South African Company began to occupy and annex territories from Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania to Uganda etc. The River Nile did not seem as the main region as occupying this waterway with the river mouth at Alexandria did not seem to benefit much to the empire's dominance in international trade and waters.

However, despite the paramount importance of the Suez Canal in world politics and British Imperialism, the rise of PostColonialism after the 2 world wars and the dispersion of the British Empire led to an increase interest of the River Nile as a source of food, livelihood and regional power. This interest resulted in a differing form of postcolonial geopolitical entity, one that challenged the previous more arrogant and Eurocentric deterministic thought. Could this more cultural holistic view on ownership and rights create a potential distinction in power relations based on the idea that the Nile gives a differing identity to each of the players involved, based on the primary use and reliance on the River. The balance between Imperialist and PostColonial thought results in the practice of Identity Politics as the interests and opinions of which people local to the area identify themselves to changes from being a subject of British Imperialism to developing their own local identities possibly influenced by their traditional use of the River Nile. In addition, the 

Hence, with many possible and varying perspectives (be it historical or contextual) of the creation of the power differentials along the River Nile, it is undoubtedly increasing in importance as a source of power within the region which translates to a possible conflict of a varied scale. With the abolishment of the Colonial imperialist mindset, the local people who differ vastly based on native tribal religious cultures may imply differing claims to rights of the River Nile. We will also have to keep in mind the countries' histories and the henceforth differing natures of the peoples living along the Nile which may have an effect on the politics that ensues. 

References:
Biltcliffe, P. (2005). Walter Crane and the imperial federation map showing the extent of the British Empire (1886). Imago Mundi, 57(1), 63-69.

Harley, J. B. (2009). Maps, knowledge, and power. Geographic Thought-A praxis perspective.

Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Thiong'o, N. W., & Iweala, U. (2015). The river between. Penguin.

Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage.

General Understanding of the River Nile

The Nile Basin can be interpreted as a source of conflict and contestation of different opinions, views and perspective even in the 21st Century. As an important source of food, economic activity and transportation, we can inarguably further define it as a battlefield of differing power relations and geopolitics.

Image taken from BBC: Top Gear

However, before diving into the deep political implications or a integrative discourse on the River Nile, we should definitely understand its generic characteristics in order to set the framework for deeper investigation into the more intricate network of links and power differentials it possesses.

The River Nile was once the longest river in the world (~6670km), before being dethroned by the Amazon River in 2007 (still contested). However, this simply illustrates the importance of the actual source and end of a river which further implies the ultimate actual length of it. Regardless, the River Nile still spans across more than half of Africa, from the Equatorial Lake Plateau consisting of Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert to the mouth into the Mediterranean Sea at the Nile River Delta near Cairo, Egypt.

Image taken from Google Maps

The actual length of the River Nile is constantly changing, however the immense length still remains an amazing feat considering that it is the only river that manages to flow even across the arid Sahara. This is strongly due to certain geological events, famous of which is the ability of the Nile to tap water through various different sources, from the Ethiopian Highlands to the Equatorial Lake region (same as Equatorial Lakes Plateau). Hence, the River Nile is blessed in the sense that water flows through the river all year round, depending on the seasonality and variability of precipitation in the different sources contributing to its flow. Taking into account the Nile's constant flow of water and its immense length, it becomes a source of life, possibly noted as "The Heart of East African life systems", like that of the Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands to the Sahel. This therefore implicates the many parties involved in the utilisation of the resources provided by the River Nile, and naturally forms the basis of the geopolitics and differing power relations between the countries and users. 

However, other physical characteristics of the River Nile should also be taken into consideration before delving straight into the politics of the region revolving around this important natural resource as inputs such as the discharge of water at specific parts of the river indicates the limitations to certain uses of the river. Also, the differing countries and peoples living around the river may have varying uses and hence need of the Nile, implying the possible differing rights between users to the resource.

With the immense length of the River Nile, it spans across a range of latitudes which have possible effects on the sources of water supply for different countries surrounding the Nile. The rest of this post therefore aims to introduce a few of the key players involved in this 'contestation', before heading into detail with whatever relevant integrated water management systems they employ. 

We can simplify the classification into the 5 major players - Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and the upper Riparian States. It is clear that the differing latitudes offers a variation of actual precipitation levels which feedbacks into the river and hence the flow of the river varies significantly from country to country. However, besides the indirect influence of latitude on precipitation and consequently river discharge, there are also presence of other factors affecting precipitation at each individual section of the river as well as other exogenous factors that may affect the river's discharge.

Image taken from USGS

In this instance, we consider the relief of each individual country located along the River Nile, as can be seen, the Upper Riparian States such as Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda have a seemingly higher elevation as compared to the countries at nearer to the mouth of the River - Egypt and Sudan. Technically, with a higher relief, the surface temperatures are lower hence there is less evapotranspiration on surface waters, resulting in supposedly higher river flows as well as river recharge levels. This theoretical example provides us with a rough idea of the differences between countries along the Nile, and hence implores us to dig deeper and further investigate individual countries' use of the River Nile as well as its implied rights to the River. 

In conclusion, it is crucial to note that this magnificent creation's inherent nature of being the longest or one of the longest rivers in the world with a vertical flow across varying latitudes imply differing abilities of the people living around the river to use the resource. As such, this further implicates a presence of a space of contestation to rights of the River, be it upstream vs downstream or top-down bottom-up localised approaches. In the coming few blogs, we will take into account certain individual key players, before assessing the present water management strategies of the River Nile, and comparing that to strategies employed in other geographical locations across the world. 

References:

Collins, Robert O. (1990) The Waters of the Nile. Clarendon Press, Oxford

Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (2007) Case Study of the Nile River Basin. 

Conway, D. (2000). The climate and hydrology of the Upper Blue Nile River. The Geographical Journal, 166(1), 49-62.

Said, R. (2013). The River Nile: geology, hydrology and utilization. Elsevier.

Conway, D. (2000). The climate and hydrology of the Upper Blue Nile River. The Geographical Journal, 166(1), 49-62.

Said, R. (2012). The geological evolution of the River Nile. Springer Science & Business Media.