Having reevaluate my previous blogpost, I realised the harsh overstatement of asserting that Imperialism and Colonisation of the 19th Century was of large extent due to the importance of domination over the Suez canal. In the following few posts, I seek to highlight the localised individual treaties between countries (or "representatives") of that era and its repercussions to current and future negotiations over the right and claims of the River Nile.
There has been plenty of treaties and agreements set between different agents with regards to the use and rights of the River Nile, however I will only mention a few that I believe have significant effects (be it direct or simply worth noting).
Firstly, my analysis would begin with the dissecting of the River Nile into 3 different regions, the lower Riparian states (Egypt and Sudan), the Blue Nile (Ethiopia or then 'Abyssinia') and the White Nile. My analysis would also follow a certain timeline, dating back to the late and early 19th and 20th Century where colonialism was rife, to that of the middle of the 20th Century when African states were rapidly gaining independence, finally to current and possibly the future. It would be beneficial if you were to compare the maps of 1902 to that of today (in my 2nd blogpost).
We set off investigating the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia over drawing the borders between Sudan (then Britain colony) and Ethiopia, of which Article 3 relates to the use of the waters in the Blue Nile.
Article III reads: "His Majestythe Emperor Menelek II, King of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan".
Till today, this treaty remains one of the most controversial, considering that it was agreed upon by Great Britain for Sudan with Ethiopia. To briefly understand the context of the issue, Ethiopia is the Upper Riparian state in the equation, and they are, by this agreement, somewhat constrained by the Lower Riparian states, Sudan and Egypt (of which both are controlled by Great Britain).
I begin by investigating the dynamics of the Geopolitical order of that region at that time and its implications on the claims over the Blue Nile. Sudan and Egypt, both represented by Great Britain, the then strongest and largest Empire in the world had nullified the influence of Ethiopia over their own rights over their own resources. This is somewhat interesting as the lower riparian states have put a foothold over the river, despite the fact that lower riparian states are often at the hands of those upstream. In addition, how did Great Britain at that time exert influence over an independent state over the control of their own natural resource which the incumbent has absolute right over considering the resource lies within its own territory. These have varying effects over certain debates and negotiations between the respective agents involved till present times. Ethiopia questioned the validity of the agreement considering that it has "never been ratified", hence there is no binding terms and conditions nor legal right over the agreement in that day. Post-independence, Sudan and Ethiopia debated on the validity of the agreement as the agreement was signed by Great Britain for Sudan, hence Sudan claims that the agreement does not hold post-independence. Finally, the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936 was recognised by the UK, hence nullifying all previous agreements and negotiations.
The language used in the agreement was also a point of contention, as both parties understood the agreement in favour of themselves. The intricate details of the agreement was not ironed out, and led to differing attitudes towards the Blue Nile. For example, "not arrest" was questioned by Ethiopia, and they perceived it to not being a synonym to "not use". This proved to be an additional focal point of the debate which led to the breakdown of negotiations and the ultimate nullifying of the agreement. However, the fact that the agreement was not ratified showed that both were somewhat appeased with what they thought the agreement meant. Therefore this proved to be conflicting as both claims over the Blue Nile were at that time legitimate held by the agreement, and the only superior intra-governing body then who could possibly intervene (the League of Nations) was strongly influenced by the British empire.
Finally, I would like to draw focus on a more local bottom-up approach towards this claim, and am opening this up for debate. With Ethiopia then being contained by this agreement, as well as others (shall not go into too much detail), the effects on local agriculture producers was stark, as depicted by poor food production of Ethiopia even till today. Understanding that the Ethiopian government was somewhat deterred by external forces, the people were subject to the effects of this "failed-governance" and should naturally show a degree of unhappiness towards their rulers. How then did the locals source for alternative sources of water? Was it enough to feed them and keep them happy? And did that lead to a form of "self-governing" in a more micro-geographical scale?
This agreement however holds significant importance in our understanding of treaties and agreements and the crucial role of external bodies observing and validating the agreement. Also, the recognition that there are flaws within the article yet not dealing with it could prove to be a point of study and further investigation. We will use this article as reference over the next 2 blogposts, regardless of its validity, in understanding how Colonial Era decisions and treaties have an impact on today's geopolitical order over the River Nile (Blue Nile in particular).
Reference:
Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.
P/s: to my fellow readers, this is not the end of a 3 part series where I breakdown individual important treaties and its current and possibly future implications. Stay tuned.
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