Part 2: Post World Wars, Self-Determination and the effects on the Geopolitical Order of the River Nile.

Continuing from the previous blogposts, we move forward in time to a different era, one where decolonisation was rife and states in Africa in particular were vying for their right towards self-determination. This results in a shift in the power struggles with respect to vying for the rights over the River Nile as well as puts plenty of the previous negotiations and treaties set by previous Colonial Rulers in shade due to aspects of "misrepresentation" (Mekonnen, 2010). I will take into considerations the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, followed by the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. We must also keep in mind the importance of the time frame and the changing dynamics of the global order due to certain events such as World War I, World War II, the Cold War etc.

With the end of the first world war, it resulted in the breakdown of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The conflicts between the 'Imperialists' also resulted in a level of distaste and questioning of the Colonial Powers' right to rule over other countries. Furthermore, the huge military losses in Europe led to a shift in the military presence in African colonies, can we therefore assume a stronger resolve on the part of the previously-oppressed such as Ethiopia in vying for rights over the use of the Blue Nile? In addition, events such as the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the stance of Woodrow Wilson (then American President) encouraged a new altered form of international framework. Taking into account the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, we try to find parallels that can be drawn towards the attitudes towards self-determination from that of water use and rights, and vice-versa.

It is also of great importance that we understand the primary uses of the Nile Water in Egypt and Sudan at that time (Swain, 1997). With increasing population numbers, coupled with the encouragement and promotion in cotton cultivation in Egypt, with considerations to the seasonalities involved in the cultivation of cotton, there was a need to shift from seasonal flooding methods to one of artificial irrigation. This led to a series of debates and negotiations over the claims to the rights of water use from upper and lower riparian countries. The 1929 Nile Water Agreement is important to note for it undermined weaker nations' actual claim of its own natural resource within its territories, causing an imbalance within the political sphere of the River Nile. Theoretically speaking, upper riparian states should and do hold sovereignty and control of not only their own rights to use the water within part of the river but are also hence in control of the downstream water quality/quantity etc. The 1929 Nile Water Agreement shows otherwise, as it was predominantly a negotiation deal between Egypt and the British Empire, over the use of the Nile Waters in Egypt and Sudan. Not only does it not take into account that of the interests of upper riparian states like Ethiopia along the Blue Nile and the Central East African nations along the White Nile, the agreement favoured Egypt tremendously (Howell and Allan, 1994). Despite allowing Sudan the right to construct along the River Nile for the benefit and development of the country, it had to go through the screening by that of the Egyptian Nile water commission of that time. Hence, this agreement highlights the then dominance of Egypt due to its military and strong links to the British Empire in control over the Nile, regardless that it supposedly should have the least power in terms of rights to the Nile based on geography. Could we hence also perceive a potential growing resistance of sorts against the rule and power of Colonial Powers and their "more important Nile Colonies". 

Post-World War II, there was yet another reshuffle in the geopolitical order and redefinition of the international framework particularly with relation to Colonies. The Atlantic Charter in 1941 somewhat set the stage for Colonies' right to self-determination. We hence consider the changes towards agreements and treaties set prior to nation's self-determination, and debunk the previous claims to water use of the Nile based on the misrepresentation of the nation's previous Colonial rulers or influences. However, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement may prove otherwise. This agreement was held between that of the previously mentioned two lower riparian states of Egypt and Sudan in the 1929 agreement, not taking into consideration the quantity/quality or right of use of water in the upper riparian states. In addition, it could be somewhat seen as a leftover effect of previous colonial era decisions, retaining Egypt's dominance over the control and delegation of the Nile Waters (Abdalla, 1971). Furthermore, it could be argued that the 1959 agreement was one of the key stepping stones for Egypt, above all the previous treaties and decisions made by that of the British Empire in their interests, for the construction of the Aswan High dam, which evolved to be a major point of contestation with respect to the right and use of the Nile Waters. 

Hence, despite self-determination being encouraged and nations along the Nile starting to gain independence, we are able to perceive a form of retention of previous Imperialist interests' in the claims of the River Nile, with Egypt remaining as the major powerhouse in terms of negotiations and agreements over the waters. With this conclusion, we will therefore investigate Egypt's power to this matter, whether it was due to a better developed framework and commission in understanding the needs of the people over the Water, or was it due to sheer military and previous colonial bias that elevated them to a higher geopolitical standing in the region in question.


References:
Abdalla, I. H. (1971). The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in Sudanese‐Egyptian relations. Middle Eastern Studies, 7(3), 329-341.

Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Mekonnen, D. Z. (2010). The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement negotiations and the adoption of a ‘Water Security’paradigm: Flight into obscurity or a logical cul-de-sac?. European Journal of International Law, 21(2), 421-440.

Swain, A. (1997). Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35(04), 675-694.

Part 1: Beginning of the undoing of Colonialism and the knock over effect of Colonial Africa on the River Nile

Having reevaluate my previous blogpost, I realised the harsh overstatement of asserting that Imperialism and Colonisation of the 19th Century was of large extent due to the importance of domination over the Suez canal. In the following few posts, I seek to highlight the localised individual treaties between countries (or "representatives") of that era and its repercussions to current and future negotiations over the right and claims of the River Nile.

There has been plenty of treaties and agreements set between different agents with regards to the use and rights of the River Nile, however I will only mention a few that I believe have significant effects (be it direct or simply worth noting).

Map of Africa in 1902

Firstly, my analysis would begin with the dissecting of the River Nile into 3 different regions, the lower Riparian states (Egypt and Sudan), the Blue Nile (Ethiopia or then 'Abyssinia') and the White Nile. My analysis would also follow a certain timeline, dating back to the late and early 19th and 20th Century where colonialism was rife, to that of the middle of the 20th Century when African states were rapidly gaining independence, finally to current and possibly the future. It would be beneficial if you were to compare the maps of 1902 to that of today (in my 2nd blogpost).

We set off investigating the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia over drawing the borders between Sudan (then Britain colony) and Ethiopia, of which Article 3 relates to the use of the waters in the Blue Nile.

Article III reads: "His Majestythe Emperor Menelek II, King of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan". 

Till today, this treaty remains one of the most controversial, considering that it was agreed upon by Great Britain for Sudan with Ethiopia. To briefly understand the context of the issue, Ethiopia is the  Upper Riparian state in the equation, and they are, by this agreement, somewhat constrained by the Lower Riparian states, Sudan and Egypt (of which both are controlled by Great Britain).

I begin by investigating the dynamics of the Geopolitical order of that region at that time and its implications on the claims over the Blue Nile. Sudan and Egypt, both represented by Great Britain, the then strongest and largest Empire in the world had nullified the influence of Ethiopia over their own rights over their own resources. This is somewhat interesting as the lower riparian states have put a foothold over the river, despite the fact that lower riparian states are often at the hands of those upstream. In addition, how did Great Britain at that time exert influence over an independent state over the control of their own natural resource which the incumbent has absolute right over considering the resource lies within its own territory. These have varying effects over certain debates and negotiations between the respective agents involved till present times. Ethiopia questioned the validity of the agreement considering that it has "never been ratified", hence there is no binding terms and conditions nor legal right over the agreement in that day. Post-independence, Sudan and Ethiopia debated on the validity of the agreement as the agreement was signed by Great Britain for Sudan, hence Sudan claims that the agreement does not hold post-independence. Finally, the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936 was recognised by the UK, hence nullifying all previous agreements and negotiations.

The language used in the agreement was also a point of contention, as both parties understood the agreement in favour of themselves. The intricate details of the agreement was not ironed out, and led to differing attitudes towards the Blue Nile. For example, "not arrest" was questioned by Ethiopia, and they perceived it to not being a synonym to "not use". This proved to be an additional focal point of the debate which led to the breakdown of negotiations and the ultimate nullifying of the agreement. However, the fact that the agreement was not ratified showed that both were somewhat appeased with what they thought the agreement meant. Therefore this proved to be conflicting as both claims over the Blue Nile were at that time legitimate held by the agreement, and the only superior intra-governing body then who could possibly intervene (the League of Nations) was strongly influenced by the British empire.

Finally, I would like to draw focus on a more local bottom-up approach towards this claim, and am opening this up for debate. With Ethiopia then being contained by this agreement, as well as others (shall not go into too much detail), the effects on local agriculture producers was stark, as depicted by poor food production of Ethiopia even till today. Understanding that the Ethiopian government was somewhat deterred by external forces, the people were subject to the effects of this "failed-governance" and should naturally show a degree of unhappiness towards their rulers. How then did the locals source for alternative sources of water? Was it enough to feed them and keep them happy? And did that lead to a form of "self-governing" in a more micro-geographical scale?

This agreement however holds significant importance in our understanding of treaties and agreements and the crucial role of external bodies observing and validating the agreement. Also, the recognition that there are flaws within the article yet not dealing with it could prove to be a point of study and further investigation. We will use this article as reference over the next 2 blogposts, regardless of its validity, in understanding how Colonial Era decisions and treaties have an impact on today's geopolitical order over the River Nile (Blue Nile in particular).

Reference:
Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.



P/s: to my fellow readers, this is not the end of a 3 part series where I breakdown individual important treaties and its current and possibly future implications. Stay tuned.

Imperialism, Post-Colonialism and its effects on the Politics along the River Nile

This episode investigates the relationship between historical contexts and the earlier establishments of the countries along the River Nile, to that of the current geopolitical discourse around water rights, whether it be influenced solely by the equitable and sustainable use of water from the Nile or is there any exogenous factors contributing to the discourse.

Image taken from Google Images

Walter Crane's Imperial Federation Map showing the extent of the British Empire in 1886 allows us to view the attitudes of the British then. Despite not showing the direct occupation of Egypt and Sudan on the map (Egypt was occupied by the British in 1882, Sudan afterwards), we are able to use various methods to showcase the then forms of Orientalism. Interpretations of the map based on geometry, representational hierarchies and decoration exemplifies the British domination of the world at that time. We can see the British-centric attitudes with Britannia being in the middle of the map (via Mercator Projection), sitting on top of the World with her trident pointing towards the middle of the world. In addition, the various trade routes drawn from Britain shows a "discursive grid of Western Knowledge and Power" across the world. Most importantly, the decoration of African labour shows the domination and rule of Britain over her colonies. The map also further shows the gender-biased nature of Colonialism, with the colonised females being sexualised, showing weakness and passivity of the colonies. This aligns with Edward Said's Orientalism, fictionally showing that the Orient as an "irrational, psychologically weak and feminised, non-European Other".

Following the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Africa was further dissected and claimed by different European powers in the "Scramble for Africa". The British Empire took control of the countries along the River Nile, except for the Ethiopian Empire who managed to fend off European invasion and influence. Linking this to the current geopolitical context in the region of the River Nile, we consider various exogenous factors contributing to the political discourse of the area.

We first consider the British intent in the 19th century whilst colonising Sudan and leaving Egypt as a protectorate. British interests then was not on the River Nile, but more so on the Suez Canal and protecting its dominant trade routes across the world. Despite at first rejecting wholly to the construction of the Suez Canal as it would threaten British controlled trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Colony). Regardless, the Suez Canal was constructed by the French and due to financial problems, it ended up with the sale of the Egyptian's share of the canal to the British to give the British leverage in decision making in the region. Hence, this very intent of colonising Egypt undermines the British and Egyptian reign on the River Nile, seeing it not as important a priority as compared to the Suez Canal. 

To add on, there is definitely a degree of coincidence to the British expansion across the River Nile. As the British Empire was keen on connecting the strategically important Suez Canal to the mineral rich South, the British South African Company began to occupy and annex territories from Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania to Uganda etc. The River Nile did not seem as the main region as occupying this waterway with the river mouth at Alexandria did not seem to benefit much to the empire's dominance in international trade and waters.

However, despite the paramount importance of the Suez Canal in world politics and British Imperialism, the rise of PostColonialism after the 2 world wars and the dispersion of the British Empire led to an increase interest of the River Nile as a source of food, livelihood and regional power. This interest resulted in a differing form of postcolonial geopolitical entity, one that challenged the previous more arrogant and Eurocentric deterministic thought. Could this more cultural holistic view on ownership and rights create a potential distinction in power relations based on the idea that the Nile gives a differing identity to each of the players involved, based on the primary use and reliance on the River. The balance between Imperialist and PostColonial thought results in the practice of Identity Politics as the interests and opinions of which people local to the area identify themselves to changes from being a subject of British Imperialism to developing their own local identities possibly influenced by their traditional use of the River Nile. In addition, the 

Hence, with many possible and varying perspectives (be it historical or contextual) of the creation of the power differentials along the River Nile, it is undoubtedly increasing in importance as a source of power within the region which translates to a possible conflict of a varied scale. With the abolishment of the Colonial imperialist mindset, the local people who differ vastly based on native tribal religious cultures may imply differing claims to rights of the River Nile. We will also have to keep in mind the countries' histories and the henceforth differing natures of the peoples living along the Nile which may have an effect on the politics that ensues. 

References:
Biltcliffe, P. (2005). Walter Crane and the imperial federation map showing the extent of the British Empire (1886). Imago Mundi, 57(1), 63-69.

Harley, J. B. (2009). Maps, knowledge, and power. Geographic Thought-A praxis perspective.

Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Thiong'o, N. W., & Iweala, U. (2015). The river between. Penguin.

Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage.