2. Nile Basin Initiative

In this post, we focus more on the efforts and developments in the cooperation between riparian states of the Nile Basin. There is a plethora of regional frameworks introduced in the latter part of the 20^th Century, but our focus would primarily be on the Nile Basin Commission’s efforts, the Nile Basin Initiative and the Cooperative Framework Agreement.

The parties involved saw the importance in acquiring more accurate and comprehensive data of the Nile, of which can be used to discern a more equitable allocation of water. This saw the creation of the ‘Permanent Joint Technical Commission’ from the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. This Technical Commission focused on more accurate collection and analysis of hydrometeorological data of the basin that aids in the riparian states in future planning of development and irrigation projects, as well as preliminary work for future cooperation and frameworks (Howell and Allan, 1994). This evolved into the Nile Basin Commission in 1983, unofficially coined ‘UNDUGU’, where Ndugu meant ‘brotherhood’ in Swahili (Mekonnen, 2010). Their first plan of action was to promote stronger cooperation amongst African nations in the Nile Basin. Two missions were executed, the first being a preliminary/exploratory mission, similar to that of the aforementioned focus on a comprehensive study of the Nile Basin, including that of economic and technical development plans. The second was aimed as a fact-finding mission, creating a strong framework for future regional cooperation among the Nile riparian states, drawing lessons from projects in the past. In addition, the second mission introduced the evaluation of populations and nations’ dependencies on the Nile waters as a life source (irrigation, fishing etc.), providing a more direct relationship and study of the utilisation of the Nile water on certain nations’. With overwhelming Egyptian influence, UNDUGU soon became irrelevant and was duly replaced by the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) in 1992. It was a significant milestone in the evolution of African (Nile basin in particular) cooperative joint frameworks, with it being a crucial ‘launch pad’ for the Nile River Action Plan – an instrumental step in the founding of the Nile Basin Initiative and the Cooperative Framework Agreement that follows (Kimenya and Mbaku, 2015).

This brings us to our main focal point of this post, the Nile Basin Initiative. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was considered the “first basin-wide agreement regarding the Nile River”, with every riparian state participating (Eritrea maintained an observer) (Suvarna, 2006). Based on the NBI, it aims to be a ‘regional intergovernmental partnership that seeks to develop the River Nile in a cooperative manner, sharing substantial socio-economic benefits and promote regional peace and security’. The efforts of the NBI can be seen in 3 distinct main programs, the Shared Vision Program, the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Program, of which all aim to use relevant and accurate data and monitoring, as well as efficient training and cooperation within riparian states to create platforms for dialogues and resolution of issues, ensuring that the basin is managed not only sustainably but also equitably (Nile Basin Initiative). This is seen as a major changing point in the geopolitical order of the Nile Basin, as the signing of the NBI shows a change in the pre-existing power relations within the region, from one which relies on military might, history and leveraging power, to a more participatory and democratic governance (Piechart, 2003). This is crucially important as it results in a more sustainable and equitable sharing of the Nile’s waters, but at the same time, it remained the source of disagreement, which would be further investigated under the Cooperative Framework Agreement. In addition, the NBI was not created as the ‘permanent fix’ of the dissolution of issues relating to the River Nile. It was created as a formal groundwork, to set aside the differences (power relations and nationalistic attitudes in allocation of the Nile’s waters) that pre-exist and to align the objectives of the members before producing a more permanent viable framework, the Cooperative Framework Agreement (Suvarna, 2006).

The Cooperative Framework Agreement, currently signed and ratified by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania, was introduced as the ‘permanent antidote’ creating a more sustainable and equitable management of the Nile’s waters. The signatories were “tired of getting permission from Egypt before using Nile waters for any development projects” such as dam constructions and irrigation. By inference, as well as by studying the negotiation process of the Cooperative Framework Agreement, it is undoubted that Egypt and Sudan both are strongly opposed to it. Why would these riparian states be so apprehensive towards this panacea of all we may ask? The Cooperative Framework Agreement understood that the previous bilateral treaties and agreements (mentioned in the blogs relating to colonialism and imperialism) were the biggest challenges to a successful permanent framework, and hence sought to be a ‘more regional and inclusive agreement able to replace these old agreements’ (Kimenya and Mbaku, 2015). However, it also required Egypt and Sudan, both major beneficiaries to give up their historically acquired rights to a more-than-fair share of the River Nile (Mekonnen, 2010). Egypt and Sudan both also claim that, according to the theory of Universal Succession, previously agreed treaties and agreements should still be followed. However, this fact was already abrogated by the 1978 Vienna Convention about State Succession and Treaties, specifically in article 14 where ‘Nothing in the present Convention shall be considered as prejudging in any respect any question relating to the validity of a treaty.’

In addition, in a bid to boost its own political standing within the agreement, Egypt aims to introduce ‘water security’ into the framework as a condition for their signature, attempting to protect its national security, as Egypt has significant dependence on the River Nile. It was even made known that Egypt does not fear using military action as a tool in ensuring its share of the Nile waters (Kendie, 1999). Till this day, negotiations are still ongoing and some have even feared that this maybe the toppling point where nations go to war over water.

References:

Howell, P. P., & Allan, J. A. (1994). The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Kendie, D. (1999). Egypt and the hydro-politics of the Blue Nile River. Northeast African Studies, 6(1), 141-169.

Kimenyi, M., & Mbaku, J. (2015). Governing the Nile river basin: The search for a new legal regime. Brookings Institution Press.

Mekonnen, D. Z. (2010). The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement negotiations and the adoption of a ‘Water Security’paradigm: Flight into obscurity or a logical cul-de-sac?. European Journal of International Law, 21(2), 421-440.

Peichert, H. (2003). The Nile basin initiative: a catalyst for cooperation. In Security and Environment in the Mediterranean (pp. 761-774). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Suvarna, S. (2006). Development Aid in an Environmental Context: Using Microfinance to Promote Equitable and Sustainable Water Use in the Nile Basin. BC Envtl. Aff. L. Rev., 33, 449.