3. Evaluation and lessons moving forward

With all that said and done, I am grateful to have undergone this investigation process as I now have a more pristine understanding on the complex relationships developed in relation to the waters of the Nile. This post therefore is a summary and (personal) points I believe requires further evaluation.

Firstly, resolving the root problems usually clears issues. What then is the root problem of this entire fiasco of sorts? It is known that Egypt depends heavily on the waters of the River Nile with its rapidly growing population (Swain, 2008). Could this therefore be solely responsible on Egypt’s ‘more rightful’ claim over the waters of the Nile seen from the earlier agreements in 1929 and 1959? I believe that it does make sense in the past where Egypt really depended on nothing but the Nile for waters for irrigation, fishing, electricity etc. However, in this day and age, advances in technology has made this claim seem like nothing but Egypt furthering its ‘hydro-hegemony’, using it as a form of leverage over the rest of the otherwise marginalised riparian states of the Nile (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Egypt, compared to some of the other riparian states, should feel blessed to have its geographical position. Despite it being a downstream (normally disadvantageous), it has direct access to both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, hence introducing other (already determined) sources of water for the ‘water-scarce’ nation. This includes desalination as well as better water storage facilities. Desalination has been successful in even more threatened ‘water-scarce’ nations like Israel and Singapore, so what is holding Egypt back? In addition, the Egypt is part of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, providing it with another huge source of water despite it being transboundary and hence also potential conflicts. Egypt could also potentially alter its “Century Storage Scheme”, instead of storing and hogging water along the Nile, could they shift to more localised forms of storage like reservoirs built off the Nile connected by pipes? These are just mere examples of potential solutions, but it shows that Egypt’s dependence on the Nile appears not to be solely based on water but maintaining a higher position in the power relations balance over the other North African nations.

In addition, Egypt has claimed that they may resort to military action should dams be built upstream which diverts and reduces their water quantities (Kimenya and Mbaku, 2015). This can also be seen as another form of assertion of its hydro-hegemony. With that said, I believe that with recent developments in the political conditions of the region, coupled with increasing involvement of big international agencies and nations such as China, this water-war is not due just yet. The Cooperative Framework Agreement acts as a form of non-aggression alliance against Egypt and Sudan, deterring any potential Egyptian military actions on upstream riparian nations because of water. In addition, the massive funding of China and World Bank on certain upstream development projects such as the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) acts as a further deterrence to potential Egyptian military actions. Further considerations include China’s position on the UN Security Council, Egypt’s position in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, as well as having their past haunt them (Suez Crisis, wars with Israel etc). As a result, I believe that it would be wise for Egypt to be content with their already dominant position in the Nile Basin and gain the moral high ground by consenting and committing to the Nile Basin commission’s future for a more equitable fair share.

This leads to my next point: why does the construction of a dam upstream necessarily spell doom to that of lower riparian states? Dams do divert water flow away, however, with the creation of a successful forum/commission in the form of the Nile Basin Initiative, could they not have an agreement on the control of the diversion of the Nile’s waters? I do strongly believe that should Egypt suffer from a shortage, a call to Ethiopia to open the floodgates of the GERD would and should settle the issue. Moreover, it does not seem that the source of the Nile is drying up or depleting anytime soon. In short, I believe that the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) should be complimented, for it provides not only a more equitable sharing of the utilisation of the Nile’s waters but also a platform for greater cooperation even with the presence of dams and previously frowned-upon activities upstream.

Although I think that credit should be given when due, it is at the same time important to not be complacent on current successes. The CFA (if signed by all the riparian states) would prove to be the world’s first cooperation over a transboundary water source, however I believe that this merely marks the beginning of an otherwise longer more arduous journey. It is also crucial that the riparian states do not treat the CFA as a tool for shared responsibility. This is a precarious position to take as it may promote instead of alleviating mistakes of the past and future. Moreover, it is crucial to point out that the conditions under which a forum like the CFA is created has its biases and issues. For example, each representing nation is subject to its own political agenda, and only by looking at the bigger picture of the region as a whole would they achieve fairness and truly equitable allocations of the Nile’s waters.

This leads to my final evaluation point, we’ve have long been scrutinising Egypt’s dominance over the Nile riparian states, as well as the leftover effects from colonialism and the successes and failures of cooperative forums (NBI, CFA). However, it is paramount to note that these are considered extreme top-down approaches towards management of the Nile’s waters. Therefore, I believe that it would be careless to not take into account participatory and bottom-up approaches towards this issue. We should also look at the micro-geographies involved, as internal conflicts within nations have significant impacts on the politics and power relations within a nation. Examples include the Oromia crisis in Ethiopia as well as internalviolence in Sudan, due to the multitudes of differing ethnicities and religions, should be focused on (Amare, 2014). Hence, I am convinced that cooperation has to be promoted not only on an international level, but on regional as well as provincial levels regardless of nation-boundaries as well.

Much research has been done into this matter. Yet, I believe that this complex situation requires more action than words. Regardless, should you be interested to read further about issues regarding water and politics, I would strongly recommend Prof. David Shinn’s blog, where I drew certain notions and inspiration from.

References:

Amare, S. (2014). Ethiopia: a nation at crossroads. Aigaforum, [online] Available at: <http://aigaforum.com/articles/A-nation-at-a-crossroads.pdf>

Kimenyi, M., & Mbaku, J. (2015). Governing the Nile river basin: The search for a new legal regime. Brookings Institution Press.

Swain, A. (2008). Mission not yet accomplished: managing water resources in the Nile River basin. Journal of International Affairs, 201-214.

Zeitoun, M. and Warner, J. (2006). ‘Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts’, Water Policy, 8(5), p. 435.